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INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES:

How TO PREVENT A WAR

OVER THE NILE RIVER

Lee A. Laudicina

t

The next war will be over water, not politics.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1
I.

Introduction

One out of every three people lacks access to an adequate supply of water, and
with significant population increases, urbanization, pollution, and global warming, the problem is rapidly intensifying. 2 While the global population has tripled
in the last century, water consumption has increased over six-fold. 3 Thus, because the world has only a fixed amount of water, geopolitical, social, and health
concerns are escalating. As the demand for water on a worldwide basis doubles
every twenty-one years, 4 35% of the global population is projected to suffer from
water scarcity or water stress by 2025. 5 Such shortages cause 3.4 million people
6
to die from water-related illnesses each year.
United Nations figures suggest there are nearly 300 potential water conflicts
around the world. 7 Because more than two billion people in the world lack access to clean drinking water, 8 tensions are most acute in developing countries,
where the little water resources that are available are often polluted or squandered. 9 Additionally, more than "90% of all future population increases will take
t
Lee Laudicina is a Juris Doctor candidate at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 2008.
He received a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Michigan, 2005.
1 Daniel Pipes, Boutros Boutros-Ghali: "I Support the Algerian Government", MIDDLE

EAST

Q.,

Sept. 1997, available at http://www.meforum.org/article/364.
2 See Alister Doyle, "Water Wars" Loom? But None in Past 4,500 Years, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 2006,
available at http://geo.oregonstate.edu/events/Press_2006/20060918_waterwars.pdf (noting that one in
three people live in a region suffering from water scarcity).
3 U.N. Population & Info. Network [POPIN], U.N. Population Div., Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs,

Population and Water Resources (contrib. by FAO), Populationand the Environment: A Review of Issues
and Concepts For Population Programmes Staff, 4, Sept. 1994, (preparedby Alain Marcoux), http:/l

www.un.org/popin/fao/water.html.
4 Stephen McCaffrey, The Coming Fresh Water Crisis: International Legal and Institutional Responses, 21 VT. L. REV. 803, 808 (1997).
5 Id. at 807-08. Water scarcity is one thousand cubic meters or less of fresh water available to each
person per year. Water stress is between one thousand and seventeen thousand cubic meters of fresh
water available to each person per year. Id. at 807.
6 Water, the Looming Source of World Conflict, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 20, 2001, available
at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/water2001/0320cflt.htm [hereinafter Looming Source of

World Conflict].

Id.
Laura Carlsen, World Water Forum Not the Place to Solve Global Water Crisis, IRC
PROGRAM COLUMN,Mar. 28, 2006, available at http://americas.irc-online.org/am/3168.
7
8

AMERICAS

9 Looming Source of World Conflict, supra note 6.
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place in the developing world."' 10 Many, therefore, recognize the Nile Basin as
the most likely spot for a war over water;"I former Secretary-General of the
United Nations,- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, said the next war in Northern Africa
would be over the waters of the Nile. 12 Because population rates are among the
highest in the world, each African country shares at least one river basin with a
neighboring nation. With the ten Nile Basin countries continuing to disagree
over its use, the region must develop a system of water use based upon transna13
tional cooperation in order to ensure future political stability.
Despite the global concern over water scarcity, infrastructural and political
barriers have historically blocked international transboundary agreements across
the globe from producing effective systems of water management. 14 Recent negotiations between the United States and Mexico, however, peacefully ended a
fifty year struggle over the shared waters of the Rio Grande River. While it has
yet to be seen if the recent progress will solve the region's long-term water
problems, it exposed methods of cooperation that can be used to foster international agreement in Northern Africa.
This article will examine the negotiations between the United States and Mexico as a basis for suggesting a method of transboundary cooperation to ease intensifying conflicts over water use in Northern Africa. Even if the current water
shortage does not cause outright warfare in the near future, "it already causes
enough violence and conflict within [African] nations to threaten social and political stability."' 5 Part II of this paper will analyze the effectiveness of the negotiations between the United States and Mexico. Part III will introduce the water
problems in Northern Africa, specifically along the Nile River. It will then examine the current status of international cooperation efforts and explain the possible consequences that will result without a change of strategy. Part IV will
introduce and critique two proposed solutions to global water scarcity: treating
access to water as a basic human right, and privatizing the water supply by making water an economic good. Part V will compare the situation between the
United States and Mexico to that of the Nile River Basin and explain why each
requires a unique solution. It will then combine aspects from the United StatesMexico dispute, the privatization model, and the human rights approach to pro10 McCaffrey, supra note 4, at 805 (quoting Stephen McCaffrey, Water,Politics and International
Law, in WATER IN CIsIs, 105 (Peter H. Gleick ed., 1993).
1 Shlomi Dinar, Ariel Dinar, Recent Developments in the Literature on Conflict Negotiation and
Cooperation Over Shared InternationalFresh Waters, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1217, 1233 (2003).
12 Pipes, supra note 1.
13 Shreevani Suvarna, Development Aid in an Environmental Context: Using Microfinance to Promote Equitable and Sustainable Water Use in the Nile Basin, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFe. L. REV. 449, 450
(2006); Valentina Okaru-Bisant, Institutional and Legal Frameworksfor Preventing and Resolving Disputes Concerning the Development and Management of Africa's Shared River Basins, 9 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'y 331, 332 (1998).

14 Rachel McHugh, Time's Come for Jointly Managing Border's Surface, Underground Water, IRC
AMERICAS PROGRAM COMMENTARY, May 9, 2005, available at http://americas.irc-online.org/commen-

tary/2005/0505tbwater.html.
15 Sandra L. Posiel & Aaron T. Wolf, Dehydrating Conflict, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 18, 2001, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/water/2001/1001fpol.htm.
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pose an optimal framework for a successful water management plan in Northern
Africa based on common interests, transnational institutions, private funding, and
minimal standards of water allocation and quality.
Although the current setting in the Nile River Basin may likely cause military
conflict, effective planning and cooperation can mold future water issues through
effective peacemaking and diplomatic efforts.
II.

The United States-Mexico Water Dispute

The United States and Mexico signed a treaty in 1944 to share the waters of
the Rio Grande,' 6 which provides drinking water for over thirteen million people.' 7 Under the terms of the treaty, the United States gains access to one-third
of the water flowing into the Rio Grande, equaling a minimum of 350,000 acrefeet annually.' 8 In return, Mexico receives 1.5 million acre-feet of water per year
from the Colorado River.' 9 Putting this number into context, economists estimate that each acre-foot of irrigation water used in the border region is worth
about $652 to the local economy.20 With such profound economic importance,
the 1944 treaty stipulated that, "if Mexico cannot deliver the required minimum
for a five-year accounting cycle because of extraordinary drought or serious accident to the water infrastructure ...Mexico must make up the deficit during the

following five-year cycle. '' 2' The treaty also created the International Boundary
and Water Commission ("IBWC") to oversee the distribution of water between
22
nations.
Up until the 1990s, Mexico was able to satisfy its internal needs as well as its
obligations under the treaty because of a water surplus. 23 However, during recent

years, Mexico has not upheld its end of the agreement. Mexico began to fall
behind on water deliveries to the United States in 1992, and a decade later, it
owed the United States roughly 450 billion gallons of water. 24 Severe droughts
in 2000 and 2001, paired with over exploitation of water resources, severely de16 Mexico's Water Debt: Behind the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty Dispute, INTERIM NEWS (House Research Organization: Texas House of Representatives), Apr. 30, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.hro.
house.state.tx.us/interim/int77-7.pdf [hereinafter Mexico's Water Debt].
17 Mary Kelly, Arturo Solis & George Kourous, The Border's Troubled Waters, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS CENTER, Nov. 2001, http://www.irc-online.org/us-mexlborderlines/2001/b183/bl83water.html.
18 Id. An acre-foot of water is the volume that would cover an acre of land at a depth of one foot, or
roughly 326,000 gallons. It will meet the water needs of a family of five for approximately one year.
Units of Measure, 24837 NBI-CLE 3, 3 (2005).
19 Mexico's Water Debt, supra note 16, at 2.
20 Id. at 3 (stating the total exchange of water under the treaty represents over $1 billion to the border
economies of the United States and Mexico).
21 Id. at 2.

22 Kelly, Solis & Kourous, supra note 17.
23 Mexico's Water Debt, supra note 16, at 5.
24 Id. at 1.
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pleted the Rio Grande.25 The shortage was so severe that in February 2001 the
Rio Grande stopped reaching the Gulf of Mexico for the first time in nearly 500
26
years because sand banks and plant growth blocked its lessened flow.

Debate over which country should have access to the dwindling water supply
has become a source of mounting tension between federal and state governments. 2 7 With thirty-eight Mexican cities facing severe water shortages, 2 8 Mexico blamed one of its worst droughts in fifty years 29 for failing to meet the
treaty's demands. 30 However, American farmers alleged that Mexico was unjustly using water to increase its own agricultural production. 3'
In August 2001, a Mexican agricultural union filed suit in a Mexican court to
stop repayment of the water, claiming they were not left with enough water for
themselves. 32 Similarly, American farmers brought suit against Mexico under
the North America Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), seeking $500 million for
33
damages and crop losses.
Mexico owed the United States over 1 million acre-feet of Water from the
1992-1997 period, plus an additional 300,000 acre-feet from the 1997-2002 period. 34 The 1944 treaty specifies that Mexico can defer water payments to the
35
following five-year period if there is a condition of "extraordinary drought,
but the treaty does not define "extraordinary drought." This omission effectively
leaves "the determination [of who gets the water] in the hands of the upstream
party when negotiators for the two countries are unable to agree."'36 Such ambiguity has fueled debate over the true extent of the drought and ignited criticism of
the treaty. 37 Like many columnists across the United States who have called for
revision of the treaty, Ruben Navarette of the Dallas Morning News wrote, "[tihe
1944 Treaty was tainted from the beginning. 3 8
25 Jonathan Treat, Mexico and U.S. Cut Rio Grande Deal, but Tensions Run High as Border Water
Runs Low, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CENTER, June 2001, http://www.irc-online.org/us-mex/border
lines/200 l/bl78/bl78water.html.
26 Id.
27

Treat, supra note 25.

28

Kelly, Solis & Kourous, supra note 17.

29

Treat, supra note 25.

30

Kelly, Solis & Kourous, supra note 17.

31

Mexico's Water Debt, supra note 16, at 5.

32

Id. at 6.

33 Suzanne Gamboa, Sources Say Mexico, U.S. Reach Agreement on Water Debt, ASSOCIATED
March 10, 2005, available at http://www.freenewmexican.com/news/ 11421 .html.

PRESS,

34 Kelly, Solis & Kourous, supra note 17.

35 Id.
36 Stephen P. Mumme, Revising the 1944 Water Treaty: Reflections on the Rio Grande Drought
Crisis and Other Matters, J. OF THE SouTHWEST, Dec. 22, 2003, available at http://goliath.ecnext.com/
coms2/summary_0199-102715ITM.
37 Id.
38
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Despite inherent flaws, the 1944 treaty is binding and the possibility of entering into an alternate treaty is highly unlikely. 39 Professor Stephen P. Mumme
explains that the treaty is "practically immutable, as difficult to change in its text
40
as any international agreement to which the United States is a party."
While the treaty's text has never been modified, it has produced over 300
minutes-official statements of meaning and intent adopted by the IBWC. 4 1
Without a system of strategic planning for management of water resources, the
treaty relies on an ad-hoc approach to problem solving.4 2 The treaty also fails to
set rules to manage droughts continuing beyond a two-cycle interval (ten years or
more). 43 Although the IBWC has authority to interpret the treaty to solve such
problems of ambiguity, the treaty does not explain the specific role the commission should take in interpreting the hydrological data it collects. an Thus, the
IBWC monitors water flows and shares information, but because the authority to
interpret data remains with the governments of the United States and Mexico, its
power of enforcement is circumscribed and international agreements are subject
45
to the difficulties of political diplomacy.
While the treaty has only produced one drought-related minute in the past
forty years, there have been three such minutes since 1995.46 Even though the
recent drought was substantial, demand for water continues to grow, making it
47
hard to determine how much of the shortage results from decreased rains.
Minutes 307 and 308 are responses to the United States' demands that Mexico
repay its deficit (estimated at 1.4 million acre-feet in 2001). 4 8 In Minute 307,
Mexico agreed to give the United States 600,000 acre-feet of water in the coming
months or to adopt other methods to meet its obligation under the treaty. 49 Minute 307 also committed the governments to "work jointly to identify measures of
cooperation on drought management." 50 When Mexico failed to deliver the
600,000 acre-feet by the time stipulated in Minute 307, the two governments
agreed on Minute 308, committing Mexico to provide the United States with
90,000 acre-feet of water. 51 Minute 308 also provides that the governments must
Id.
Id. (noting that altering the treaty would affect domestic water law in a number of states, as well as
impact half a dozen interstate compacts).
41 Id. at 3 (noting that the minutes were adopted in meetings of the IBWC and signed by representatives from the United States and Mexico).
42 Id. at 2, 3.
39

40

43

Id. at 4.

44 Id.
45 Id.
46

Id. at 5 (noting that there was a drought-related minute passed in 1952).

47 Id.
48 Id.

,49 Id.
50

Id.

51 Id.
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ask international funding agencies to help finance conservation projects in Mex52
ico and must also increase data exchanges on water flows between the nations.
Abundant rains in 2003 and 2004 allowed Mexico to reduce its debt to the
United States to below 800,000 acre-feet and temporarily quieted dissatisfied
farmers on both sides of the border, 53 but environmental groups assert that alleviating the immediate water shortage will do little to solve the border region's
long-term water problems. 54 According to a recent study by the Universidad
Nacional Autonoma de Mexico ("UNAM"), Mexico's cities lose almost 40% of
their water "as a result of leaks and 55faulty equipment. In some cities, half the
water is lost due to such problems.
Nevertheless, the recent treaty minutes represent significant progress toward
solving such problems and fostering international cooperation. The minute procedure has turned out to be "a flexible mechanism of binational cooperation,
allowing for the application, extension, elaboration, and modification of the
treaty's provisions. '5 6 Further, the United States and Mexico, in the last decade,
have recognized the need to create sustainable water management plans, pursue
international financing, increase data sharing, strengthen the IBWC, and to de57
velop a forum for binational cooperation.
While abundant rains and positive agreements have tamed the United StatesMexico conflict for now, without increased cooperation around the globe, similar
future conflicts will escalate much further.
III.

Water Problems of the Nile Basin

The Nile River, the world's longest river, runs through much of Africa, yet
36% of Africa's population lacks access to clean drinking water. 58 The Nile
Basin, home to 160 million people, 59 suffers from "poverty, [political] instability,
rapid population growth, environmental degradation and frequent natural disasters. '' 60 Such problems have made international agreement concerning water use
very difficult.
The waters of the Nile are shared by ten countries-Kenya, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania,
52 Id.

53 Gamboa, supra note 33.
54 Mexico's Water Debt, supra note 16, at 6.
55 Kelly, Solis & Kourous, supra note 17.
56 Mumme, supra note 36.
57 Id.

58 Jacklynne Hobbs, Do 'Water Wars' Still Loom in Africa, INTER PRESS SERVICE, May 15, 2004,
available at http://ipsnews.net/africa/intema.asp?idnews=23759.
59 Id.

60 Nile Basin Initiative: Overview, The World Bank Group, available at http://www.worldbank.org/
afr/nilebasin/overview.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
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and Uganda 6 1-four of which are among the world's ten poorest states. 62 The
1929 Nile Basin Treaty, revised in 1959, regulates the use of the Nile waters
today. 63 The treaty pits Egypt and Sudan against the other riparian nations by
prohibiting the other eight countries from undertaking any project that may cause
a drop in Egypt or Sudan's
water level without getting permission from both
64
Egypt and Sudan first.
Tension over the Nile started in colonial times when nations with colonial
representation (Sudan and Egypt) were able to exploit the resources of the other
Basin nations. 65 At the beginning of the twentieth century, a world cotton
shortage led Egypt (under British rule) to focus on producing cotton, which requires constant irrigation and high levels of water. 66 The Nile Projects Commission, comprising representatives from India, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, was formed in 1920 to compile estimates of each of the Basin states'
water needs. 67 By the end of World War I, Egypt recognized the need to create a
formal agreement on water allocation before further advancing any regional development plans. 68 The 1929 Treaty ensued, giving most of the Nile's water to
Egypt. 69 Sudan later convinced Egypt that its population was 50% larger than
estimated in 1929 and the two countries adjusted the water allocations accordingly by revising the treaty in 1959.70
The Nile produces an estimated seventy-four BCM (billion cubic meters) of
water annually for distribution among Basin nations. 7 1 Under the 1959 agreement, Egypt receives fifty-five and a half BCM per year and Sudan receives
eighteen and a half BCM per year. 72 Egypt and Sudan estimated that the combined needs of all other riparian nations would not exceed one or two BCM per
year. 73 The treaty specified that if any other nation wanted to make a claim for
more water, it would have to be approved by a unified Egyptian-Sudanese position. 74 Egypt also reserved the right to unilaterally begin any Nile-related project
61 Cathy Majtenyi, African Water Ministers Call for Better Nile River Cooperation, VOICE OF
AMERICA, Mar. 18, 2004, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/secufity/natres/water/2004/0318minister.htm.
62 Joyce Mulama, Development-East Africa: The Fate of the Nile in the Spotlight, INrR PRESS
SERVICE, Mar. 16, 2004, http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=22875.
63 Id. at 1.

64 Id.
65 Kimberly E. Foulds, The Nile Basin Initiative: Challenges to Implementation (Managing Shared
Water Conference), June 23-28, 2002, http://nilebasin.com/documents/kim I.htm.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.

70 The Nile Waters Agreement, Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/projects/casestudies/nileagreement.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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without the consent of the other riparian nations. 75 Despite the glaring inequities,
the other basin nations have adhered to the allocations of the treaty until present
day, and no other riparian nation
has exercised a legal claim to the waters distrib76
uted under the 1959 treaty.
However, the other riparian nations have expressed dissatisfaction with their
current access to Nile waters. 77 Ethiopia, for example, one of the world's poorest
nations, accounts for more than 75% of the water flowing into the Nile, but consumes less than 1% of the Nile's water. 7 8 Since 1957, Ethiopia has spoken of
pursuing unilateral water development 79 and has recently announced plans to use
Nile water for irrigation. 80 Similarly, Tanzania is formulating a $27.6 billion
project to construct a pipeline which extracts drinking water from the Nile.8 1
Further, since its independence, the Kenyan government has stated publicly that
it does not recognize the treaty. 82 Despite such dissatisfaction, the treaty has
remained intact because Egypt has made it known that it will consider any at83
tempt to violate the treaty as an act of war.
In renouncing the treaty, Tanzania's Minister of Water Resources, Edward
Lowasa, explained its inequitable underpinnings by saying, "the treaties have
been entered into without the consent of the people of the region. The British
had no mandate to sign treaties with Egypt on our behalf."' 84 As outrage spread
throughout Northern Africa, the East African press printed editorials chronicling
85
the injustice of the treaty as a "colonial relic."
However, Egypt's Minister of Water and Irrigation, Mahmoud Abu-Zeid, exclaimed that "any unilateral change in the 1929 Nile Basin Treaty would be a
breach of international law."' 86 Even though all the riparian nations did not ratify
the treaty, Abu-Zeid's claim has merit because non-party states are bound by a
provision in an international treaty when it rises to the level of international customary law (as the Nile Basin Treaty has). 87 As a result, for change to be effec75 Gamal Nkrumah, Fresh Water Talks,
edu/display.article?id=4080.
76 Hobbs, supra note 58.

AL-AHRAM WEEKLY,

June 11, 2004, http://yaleglobal.yale.

See Nkrumah, supra note 75.
The Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 70; Mulama supra note 62 (providing that 80% of Ethiopians live under the poverty line of a dollar a day).
79 Foulds, supra note 65.
80 Martin Plaut, Nile States Hold 'Crisis Talk,', BBC, Mar. 7, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
3541617.stm#top.
81 Nkrumah, supra note 75.
82 Kenya: Minister Gives Kenya Positionon the Treaty, allAfrica.com, Jan. 12, 2007, http://allafrica.
com/stories/200701110918.html.
83 See Majtenyi, supra note 61.
77
78

84 Nkrumah, supra note 75.
85 Davin O'Regan, The Nile River: Building or Stumbling Block?, allAfrica.com, Apr. 30, 2004,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200404300089.html.
86 Id.
87 Amy Hardberger, Whose Job is it Anyway?: Governmental Obligations Created by the Human
Right to Water, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 533, 537 (2006) [hereinafter Government Obligations].
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tive, it must be agreed upon collectively with all the riparian nations, including
Egypt and Sudan.
Recognizing the need for collective action, the Nile nations took a historic step
by establishing the Nile Basin Initiative ("NBI") in February 1999. 8 8 The program was designed "to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through
the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources." 89 The NBI created the Nile Council of Ministers ("Nile-COM"), comprising water ministers from all of the riparian countries, as its highest decisionmaking body. 90 The Nile-COM released a statement declaring, "[w]e all believe
that by moving together to major joint development, we can look forward to
peace and prosperity and not backwards to dispute and conflict." 9 1 However, the
NBI is only a transitional arrangement designed to foster communication until a
permanent framework is in place. 92 While the NBI is a great step toward diplomacy, until a permanent water management program is created, conflict will continue to escalate.
The NBI did not establish specific goals or deadlines for progress; it focused
more on building trust. 93 The World Bank Senior Water Advisor, David Grey,
stated that the NBI's goal is to negotiate a legal framework for establishing and
discussing development projects, but such progress has "yet to be attained in its
seven years of existence. '94 Accordingly, the NBI has many critics, including
Mekonen Loulseged, head of the Ethiopian Ministry of Water Resources' Design
Department, who stated that, "[u]ntil the agreement of 1959 is null and void,
cooperation will be unsustainable. ' 95 Journalist Gamal Nkrumah added that, "the
gap between the NBI's aims and means leaves the body ineffective and
96
unconvincing.
For the NBI to reach its goal, the Nile region must have greater political stability. 97 Achieving stability includes ending civil wars and border disputes. 9 8 Contributing to the current instability are "recent or ongoing armed conflicts in at
least four, and between two of the [stakeholder countries]." 99 As a result of the
present political environment, Jo Raisin, a consultant with the United States
Agency for International Development, stated that "the projects of the NBI will
88

Nile Basin Initiative: Overview, supra note 60.

89

Id.

90

O'Regan, supra note 85.

91 Id.
92

Nile Basin Initiative: Overview, supra note 60.

93

O'Regan, supra note 85.

94

Id.

95
96

Foulds, supra note 65.
Nkrumah, supra note 75.

97

Id.

98 Id.

99 Foulds, supra note 65 (remembering that Sudan is suffering from a period of civil war and its
government allegedly organized efforts to overthrow Egypt's president, Hosni Mubarak).
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take at least twenty years to implement." 1°° Such instability has already lead to
unilateral actions which threaten the effectiveness of the NBI, such as the irrigation plans in Ethiopia and the pipeline construction in Tanzania. Kenyan politician Samson Ojiayo encouraged Kenya to take water for itself because a "war on
one nation means war on all." 101 A source close to the Tanzanian government
who refused to be named added, "[w]e cannot sit and wait while we can save our
people from famine." 10 2 Such sentiments illustrate the increasing probability of a
water war in Northern Africa.
Other problems in the area include recurrent droughts, conflicts of interest
stemming from ethnic rivalries, 0 3 and severe pollution.10 4 For example, Lake
Victoria, the Nile's major source, "has become the toilet for East Africa. People
are doing all sorts of things in the lake-including urinating [and] passing
stools. ' 10 5 While the NBI has much work left to do, "if countries sharing the
waterway are able to rise above the history, the poverty, and the conflict that
threatens cooperative engagement,
the pay-off may be significant economic de06
velopment and regional peace."'
Today, the 1929 treaty continues to govern the Nile Basin as customary international law. The NBI represents a momentous step of collective action, but
without effective enforcement mechanisms in place, it will not prevent conflict.
Despite international discussions beginning to form, Egypt still controls the water
supply, tensions remain high, and faced with extreme poverty, disease and
drought, other Basin nations are beginning to take unilateral actions to violate of
the treaty.
IV.

Proposed Solutions to International Water Disputes

There are two main approaches to solving problems of transboundary water
allocation: privatizing the water supply and recognizing a human right to water.
This section will briefly explain each method and then show why neither solution
would be effective in Northern Africa.
A.

The Privatization of Water

In an effort to bring economic improvements to developing countries, some
governments have begun to treat water as a commodity by privatizing water sys100 Id.
101 Mulama supra note 62 (Samson Ojiayo is a Coordinator of Bunge la Wananchi [Parliament of the
People]).
102 Id.
103

Foulds, supra note 65.

104

Hobbs, supra note 58.

105 Id. (quoting Rosemary Rop of Maji na Ufanisi [Water and Development], a non-governmental
organization in Kenya).
106 O'Regan, supra note 85.
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tems. 10 7 Under the privatization approach, governments solicit private companies "to take over the management, operation, and sometimes even the ownership
of the public water sector."' 10 8 The system's proponents, such as the World
Bank, claim that privatization provides incentives for countries to preserve water
resources and promotes efficiency in services.109
Privatization would give individuals who have a direct personal stake in the
enterprise the power to make decisions regarding the price of water. 110 It also
has the potential for quick results because the private sector can more easily
obtain capital than the public sector. 11 ' Such access to capital would be especially useful in poor nations that do not have the necessary funding to improve
flawed infrastructures.
However, privatization has brought fervent opposition. In March 2006,
thousands of people marched through Mexico City protesting water privatization;12
it was the first time an environmental issue had mobilized so many people."1 13
Many fear that "profit-driven companies will be reluctant to serve the poor"
and will take advantage of gratuitous price increases.1 4 Water sold as a comto the privileged and can deepen inequalities bemodity is often only affordable
5
tween the rich and poor. 1'
Recent privatization projects have not been successful, even in poor, developing nations.' 16 In Latin America, for example, "private concessions have exacerbated inequities in access to water by focusing services in lucrative urban zones
and ignoring areas where the need is worst."' 1 7 Experts have also declared one
of the world's largest privatization efforts, taking place in the Philippines, a failure because of substantial increases in water rates, water losses due to inadequate
infrastructure, and insufficient private funding to maintain programs for the urban poor. 18
Nile Basin nations cannot afford the risk of increased civil protest or violence.
The director of the International Relations Center Americas Program, Laura Carlson, exclaimed, "[t]he privatization model for water use and distribution has
failed to deliver. It's time to make room for new, more democratic, alterna107 Amy K. Miller, Blue Rush: Is an International Privatization Agreement a Viable Solution for
Developing Countriesin the Face of an Impending World Water Crisis?, 16 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV.
217, 218-19 (2005).
108 Id. at 218.
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tives." 119 Globally, public opinion is strongly against private-sector management
of water resources,12 0 and people more often view water as a basic human right
12 1
that should not be managed by private companies.
B.

Water as a Human Right

It is hard to imagine many things more deserving of human right status than
access to water; life cannot exist without water. Yet, human rights are a relatively new and rapidly expanding source of international law. 12 2 Human rights
are "the freedoms, immunities, and benefits that, according to modern values
(especially at an international level), all human beings should be able to claim as
a matter of right in the society in which they live."' 123 Such human rights are
protected by international standards that ensure fundamental freedoms and24are
normally held by citizens and enforced against their nation of citizenship.
Human rights are divided into two categories: welfare rights and liberty
rights.' 2 5 Welfare rights are those rights necessary to assure the availability of
goods or services vital to human well-being. 126 They are positive rights because
the state must take affirmative action to ensure welfare rights exist for its citizens. 127 Such rights include economic, cultural, and social rights. 12 8 Liberty
rights are those which the government cannot interfere with, such as civil, political, and moral rights. 129 Liberty rights are negative rights because the state is
only required to refrain from interfering with them; there is no duty for the state
30
to actively provide liberty rights.'
Currently, international law does not explicitly recognize the right to water as
a human right. If there is to be such a right, it must either be inferred from
existing rights or created as a right in itself. 3 1 Inferring the right is a realistic
possibility because the dependency on water to survive closely parallels rights
already considered customary in international law. If inferred from the right to
life, the right to water would become a liberty right and governments would only
be obligated to prevent interference with access; there would be no obligation to
119 Carlsen, supra note 8.
120 Id. at 1.
121 Id.

122 Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right
and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4 Nw. U. J. INT'L HuM. Rrs. 331, 335 (2005).
123 BLACK'S LAW DIC-TONARY 712 (7th ed. 1999).
124 Government Obligations, supra note 87, at 536.
125 Id. at 537.
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131 Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications, 5

GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 20 (1992).
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provide a minimal amount of water to citizens.132 Another option arises through
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims that
everyone has "the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food."' 133 Such a standard of living
could not be maintained without access to a minimal level of clean water. If
included under the right to a standard of living, the right to water would become
a welfare right, giving the state a positive duty to provide access for its citizens.' 34 While an inadequate water supply would then seemingly constitute a
violation of the right to water, an expectation of unlimited access is not realistic,
so international law would have to create a middle ground.' 35 A solution could
require states to deliver a minimum allowance of water to citizens, but only if
they have the economic ability to do so.
With a welfare right to water, the question arises whether neighboring states
have the obligation to assist nations which do not have the capability of providing an adequate amount of water to their citizens. It is generally accepted in
international law that a state can exploit its own resources, but cannot exploit the
resources of other states. 136 Fair resource sharing can be achieved by following
the doctrine of equitable utilization which allows a nation to "utilize a resource as
long as it does not harm another user who is using the resource equitably."' 137 In
administering water as a human right, "it seems clear that a state's "right" to
receive water from a co-riparian state would not require more from the co-riparian than that it use the international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner."' 13 8 However, equitable utilization sets a vague standard of what is considered "equitable" and how to determine whether a state is "economically capable" of providing minimum levels of water. Such ambiguities will prove
especially difficult to enforce in Northern Africa, where nations are plagued by
political instability, tension, and contrasting cultures.
If created as its own individual right, access to water would likely become a
welfare right, just as other social rights. 139 While the right to water has not
reached status as international customary law, textual support has increased recognition of the right to water and several nations, including South Africa and
Ethiopia, have already begun to recognize a human right to water.' 40 In 2002,

132

See Hardberger, supra note 122, at 344, 336.

133 Hardberger, supra note 122, at 337; McCaffrey, supra note 131, at I (Article 25 was adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly in 1948).
134 McCaffrey, supra note 131, at 8.
135 Government Obligations, supra note 87, at 540.
136 Id. at 543.
137 Id. (equitable utilization does not mean that neighboring states have to have equal access to water.
It simply means each state should be able to provide at least a minimal standard).
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Comment 15 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights ("ICESCR") recognized water as a separate right. 14 1 The comment states:
The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable,
physically accessible[,] and affordable water for personal and domestic
uses. An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death
from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease[,] and to
cooking, personal[,] and domestic hygienic
provide for consumption,
42
requirements. 1
This definition is significant because it mentions the quantity, quality, and
accessibility to water; not just a general need for drinking water. 143 While Comment 15 is not binding per se, it is intended to clarify rights given in the covenant, and provides strong support for establishing water as a human right by
raising levels of social and political awareness. 144
However, recognizing water as a human right is not the best mechanism for
bringing a timely solution to the problems of the Nile River Basin. Establishing
a human right to water is purported to help reduce poverty by raising the living
standard, but there is no guarantee of such a result.' 45 While the right to food, for
instance, is recognized as a human right, widespread famine still exists. 14 6 Furthermore, the unstable and impoverished nations of the Nile Basin would have
extreme difficulty enforcing claims of deprived water access; especially claims
regarding co-riparian nations. In countries that currently recognize water as a
human right, like South Africa, the local courts adjudicate accountability in situations of misuse. 147 However, such an enforcement mechanism would be ineffective against co-riparian nations as questions of jurisdiction, and the
responsibilities neighboring states owe one another are yet to be definitively answered. Moreover, most Nile Basin countries suffer from dysfunctional judicial
systems and most judges are unable to adjudicate water disputes effectively because government administrative institutions often undermine the independence
of judiciary systems.' 4 8 While a human right to water may eventually become
customary international law, with rapidly diminishing resources, increasing poverty, and continuing political instability, the riparian nations of the Nile Basin
cannot wait until that time comes.
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V.

A Solution for the Nile Basin

The general contention among international practitioners and commentators is
that it is not possible to establish a generic model of water law applicable to all
nations.' 49 Yet, great progress can be made in the Nile Basin if the riparian
nations supplement the NBI by extracting features from the recent United
States-Mexico negotiations, the privatization model, and the human rights
model. To prevent future conflict, Basin nations should focus on their common
interests and develop a central institution backed by private funding that has the
power to enforce agreements, which maintain flexible standards of water allocation and quality.
There are a number of reasons why the current decision-making body in
Northern Africa, the Nile-COM, cannot merely mimic the United States-Mexico agreements. First, abundant rains were arguably the most influential factor
enabling Mexico to satisfy the United States' demands for repayment. In the
50
Nile Basin, however, drought conditions have not subsided in recent years.'
Furthermore, the United States and Mexico are allies and much more politically
stable than the ten riparian nations of Northern Africa. Also, the 1944 treaty was
ratified by both North American countries; the 1959 agreement, however, did not
include eight of the riparian nations. Ten poverty-stricken nations desperate for
resources with a long history of political instability will have much more difficulty reaching a compromise than the United States and Mexico.
As allies, each of whom has other sources of water, the United States and
Mexico allow for water debt forgiveness in a given year if repaid as soon as
possible. 51 Such a trusting agreement is highly unlikely among the historic rivals of the Nile Basin. Moreover, while the 1944 treaty created the IBWC, 152 the
Nile-COM, created by the 1959 agreement, is an ineffective counterpart as a
mechanism to enforce the treaty's provisions and foster co-riparian cooperation.
Yet, the recent negotiations between the United States and Mexico do have
positive aspects which can help the Nile Basin, as well as shortcomings which
can be improved upon in future Nile negotiations. First, and most importantly,
Minutes 307 and 308 show an interest of increased collaboration for both countries and illustrate diplomatic compromise as a means to tame tensions over international water.' 53 Expressing such a common interest has been the greatest
success of the NBI154 and such efforts must continue to expand. NBI Executive
Director Meraji Msuya recognized the accomplishment in saying, "there has been
149 Andrew Allan, A Comparison Between the Water Law Reforms in South Africa and Scotland: Can
a Generic National Water Law Model Be Developed from These Examples?, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 419,
474 (2003).
150 See Mulama, supra note 62 (Ethiopia currently suffers from a severe drought).
151 Mumme, supra note 36.
152 Id.
153Rachel McHugh, Federal Aquifer Bill Would Help Calm Troubled U.S.-Mexico Border Waters,
IRC AMERICAS PROGRAM POLICY REPORT, Mar. 21, 2005, availableat http://americas.irc-online.org/am/
740.
154 Nkrumah, supra note 75, at 4 ("the most important new development is that the states of the Nile
Basin are meeting regularly, discussing openly and exchanging viewpoints and ironing out differences").
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tremendous achievement [since the formation of the NBI]. People are now talking openly about the Nile ...not like it was ten to fifteen years ago when no one
could talk about it."155

The IBWC also exposes two important features of an effective transboundary
water agreement: the importance of sharing data and the need to establish an
enforcement institution. The Nile nations must commit to more extensive datasharing methods than the United States and Mexico did with the IBWC, which
left the responsibility of data interpretation to individual governments. 156 This
will be especially difficult in Northern Africa "because most basin countries lack
the capacity to share environmental and scientific data on the shared water use
and development initiatives." 157 Since the IBWC was not fully effective in monitoring shortages in binational rivers,1 58 Nile nations must develop a similar institution that has extensive powers to share data and enforce water allotments.
A major problem across most international water agreements is that "apart
from the force of public opinion, there is no effective monitoring and compliance
system to ensure that obligations assumed under treaties are enforced within national boundaries."' 159 Most riparian nations have also had trouble enforcing international agreements because they have not clearly defined their water
boundaries.16 0 The creation of a central institution similar to the IBWC, but with
powers to interpret data, enforce agreements, and define boundaries, would be a
significant step toward not only reaching an agreement today, but also toward
6
ensuring the success of future agreements.' '
When creating such an institution, Basin nations should follow recent trends in
environmental border management that favor greater public participation. 62 A
major weakness of the 1944 treaty is that it contains no provision for public
consultation, relations, or participation. 163 International politics professor Stephen P. Mumme noted, "[a]s originally conceived, then, the IBWC was to be a
secretive, hierarchical, and otherwise narrow body... [with an] exclusivist, priv'164 Nile nations
ileged approach to border water management."
could avoid such
a downfall by creating a representative body to assess progress toward stated
155 Mulama, supra note 62.
156 Mumme, supra note 36.
157 Okaru-Bisant, supra note 13, at 343 (nations lack the capacity to share information because of
infrastructural shortcomings).

158Mumme, supra note 36.
159 Okaru-Bisant, supra note 13, at 350.
160 Id.

161 Id. at 357-58 ("Problems in the available institutional and legal frameworks at the regional level
further demonstrate the need to strengthen the enforcement of available laws and enhance both the soundness and performance of existing institutions").
162 Mumme, supra note 36.
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goals and strategies. 65 Such active public participation "is required 16to6 maintain
the legitimacy and strength of regulatory and management bodies."'
Nations of the Nile Basin should also look to most other African river basins
which have entered into regional agreements 67 using inter-governmental structures. 168 Every international river basin in Southern Africa already has a commission in place or one currently being developed.1 69 The Tri-partite Permanent
Technical Commission, established by South Africa, Mozambique, and Swazi170
land, is an example of such an institution that has proven successful.
When creating such a transboundary institution, co-riparian nations should
prescribe minimal standards for water allocation and quality. 17 In doing so,
countries can look to international human rights vocabulary without having to
adopt water as a human right. A stated purpose to provide a minimal standard of
both quality and quantity of water to all nations for reasonable use, which allows
for decent human subsistence and the prevention health concerns, would improve
upon the current vague standard of equitable utilization. 72 A potential agreement must also leave room for future growth. Nile water flows are often deceptive, and demands can frequently change due to such factors as population
growth. 173 Adopting a flexible definition of "reasonable use" will be more easily
subject to future change than the 1959 agreement which allocates specific BCMs
of water to each riparian country.
As proponents for the privatization model profess, funding will be a major
hurdle for the poverty-stricken basin nations. While avoiding the risk of deepening inequalities inherent in the full scale privatization model, North African
countries should take advantage of the model's aggressive funding procedures.
Adopting a large-scale effort to attract finances from abroad is a fundamental
necessity for poor nations. By building international trust and identifying similar
interests with other nations, obtaining such funds is a realistic goal. Looking at
the United States and Mexico for example, "due to the proximity of the two
states, environmental hazards created in Mexico by a lack of infrastructure directly affect both sides of the border; therefore, the United States has a vested
interest in assisting Mexico with water supply and treatment facilities." 174 With
so many interdependent nations on the Nile amid serious drought, pollution, and
165 Allan, supra note 149, at 486.
166 Id.

167 Okaru-Bisant, supra note 13, at 358.
168 Hobbs, supra note 58.
169 Id.
170 Id.

171 Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of
International Water Resources Law, 90 Am. J. INT'L L. 384, 400 (1996).
172 Id. at 12.
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174 Government Obligations, supra note 87, at 548.
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poverty concerns, the NBI can appeal to similar international interests. By mid
175
2004, the NBI had already raised $130 million from donors.
The solutions proposed herein will allow the Nile Basin to effectively deal
with problems of population growth, urbanization, poverty, political instability,
and pollution. Flexible standards designed to evolve with time are apt to accommodate shifting population and urbanization trends. Increased international funding will supplement insufficient infrastructural budgets and minimum standards
of quality will raise the level of life at the poverty line and reduce pollution.
Lastly, by strengthening binational forums and implementing an inter-governmental institution with the power to enforce agreements, cooperative efforts will
ultimately alleviate political instability by fostering trust and communication
throughout the region.
VI.

Conclusion

Although conflict over the Nile waters may likely escalate to warfare, if managed correctly, the international water shortage can serve as a pathway to
177
peace.' 76 By coming together, countries can build trust and prevent conflict.
The Nile nations must use water as a negotiating tool, which offers communica178
tion and common interests in the midst of crisis.
The NBI is a monumental step, but there is much more work to be done.
Despite recent increased communications, relations between Egypt and Kenya hit
a low during a meeting of the Nile-COM in December 2006 when "Kenya's
Minister of Water Resources, Marha Karua, stormed out of the talks after disagreements about sharing of the Nile's resources, an action that was termed a
79
'declaration of war' by her Egyptian counterpart, Mahmoud Abu-Zeid."'
The recent negotiations between the United States and Mexico have shown
that implementing an inter-governmental institution designed to share data and
enforce future agreements will enable co-riparian nations to begin paving a path
to peace. Negotiations must involve active public participation and flexible standards which evolve as demands change. The NBI must also continue focused
efforts to attract international investors and foster international communication.
Joint development of the Nile's resources creates an opportunity to institutionalize cooperation in a win-win situation for Basin nations plagued by a history of
warfare. Yet, despite recent progress, failure of the NBI would generate even
greater mistrust and suspicion among co-riparian nations, thus making the risk of
armed conflict even more probable. 180 Recognizing the gravity of the situation,
the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry in South Africa, Ronnie Kasrils, said,
175 O'Regan, supra note 85.
176 Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Water Can Be a Pathway to Peace, Not War, GLOBAL POL'Y FORUM, June
2005, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/water/2005/06peace.htm.
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"[b]ut I state very clearly-we can deliver clean drinking water and adequate
sanitation to the people of the world IF WE TRULY WANT TO, IF WE HAVE
THE POLITICAL WILL TO DO SO."I8I With the need for change in the international spotlight, the time for action is now and the nations of the Nile River
must focus on their common interests by looking to other transboundary water
disputes and proposed solutions for effective methods of fostering collective
action.
The recent United States-Mexico agreements illustrate the importance of a
trans-national water management system with the power to enforce agreements
through a centralized institution. Further, the water quality standards of the
human rights model provide a strategy to prevent disease and decrease pollution.
Finally, the methodology of the privatization model creates a means to generate
the necessary funding to produce a lasting effect. Thus, implementing an international system of collective action based upon each of these principles has the
potential not only to prevent war in Northern Africa, but also to promote peace
and provide water to the citizens of one of the most over-populated and impoverished regions in the world.
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